

TCP 24-74

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070025-1

Confidential

1 of 1

Trends In Communist Propaganda

12 June 74

Confidential

F B I S

TRENDS

In Communist Propaganda

Confidential

12 JUNE 1974

This propaganda analysis report is based exclusively on material carried in foreign broadcast and press media. It is published by FBIS without coordination with other U.S. Government components.

STATSPEC



National Security Information
Unauthorized disclosure subject to
criminal sanctions

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
12 JUNE 1974

CONTENTS

NIXON MIDEAST TOUR

Moscow Avoids Comment on President's Trip, Plays Up Detente.	1
Hanoi Reacts to Nixon Middle East Tour, Planned Soviet Trip.	2

EAST-WEST RELATIONS

Grechko, Yepishev Defend Military Priorities Under Detente	4
--	---

EUROPE

USSR, Allies Reject CSCE Pessimism, Suggest Delayed Summit	7
Moscow Minimizes EC Ministers' Agreements, Stresses Problems	9

COMMUNIST RELATIONS

Moscow, East Europeans Step Up Pressure for World Conference	12
Moscow Rediscovered "Different Roads to Socialism" Doctrine	14

VIETNAM

Kissinger's Remarks on Vietnam Draw "Commentator" Article.	16
PRG Agrees to Resume Participation in JMC Talks.	18
Customary Celebrations Mark PRG Fifth Anniversary.	19
Truong Chinh Delegation Concludes Visits in East Europe.	23

PRC FOREIGN RELATIONS

Peking Views Favorably U.S. Policy Prior to Moscow Summit.	24
Peking Reiterates Approval for European Unity, U.S. Alliance	25

CHINA

"Worker Theorists" Organized to Help Guide Anti-Lin Campaign	27
--	----

USSR

Petrenko Upholds Collegiality, Scolds Party Apparatus.	29
Ukraine, Moldavia Break Ranks on Academic Celebration.	31
Firing of History Institute Director Volobuyev Detailed.	33

NOTE

Moscow on Palestinian Issue.	36
--------------------------------------	----

APPENDIX

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
12 JUNE 1974

- 1 -

NIXON MIDEAST TOUR

MOSCOW AVOIDS COMMENT ON PRESIDENT'S TRIP, PLAYS UP DETENTE

Moscow has given minimal coverage thus far to President Nixon's Middle East tour, apparently deciding that the best way of handling the awkward sequence of the President's Mideast and Moscow visits is to play down the former. The only suggestion of Soviet concern over the possible impact of the trip came in remarks on Soviet foreign policy by Gromyko in his Supreme Soviet election speech in Minsk on 10 June. Referring to the "high" prestige of the USSR's foreign policy, Gromyko declared that no important international problem could be solved without Soviet participation, and added that "it certainly cannot be solved to the detriment of the Soviet Union's interests."

Reportage on the President's tour so far has been confined to terse TASS and Moscow domestic service newscast reports on the President's departure for Europe on the 10th and his meeting on the 11th with Austrian Chancellor Kreisky in Salzburg. The sole Moscow observation on the visit came in PRAVDA's international review on the 9th, which merely noted that a large part of the world press regarded the Nixon tour, and the possible resumption of U.S.-Syrian relations, as evidence of an American desire to normalize U.S.-Arab relations which had been "undermined" by U.S. support for the Israeli "aggressors."

Moscow has also given short shrift to recent U.S. policy statements on the Middle East. Soviet accounts of the President's 5 June Annapolis address failed to mention his remarks on the Middle East, including his statement on the urgent need for a stable solution "among the regional parties as well as between the great powers." Nor did Moscow report Secretary Kissinger's statement at his 6 June news conference that the Middle East is obviously an area of great concern to the Soviet Union, and that the United States has neither the intention nor the capability of expelling Soviet influence from the area.

At the same time, with the forthcoming Moscow summit meeting obviously in mind, Soviet commentators have gone out of their way to play up the benefits of detente. Thus, Kolesnichenko's weekly review broadcast to North America on the 10th singled out Nixon's Annapolis remarks on the importance of detente and went on to cite the Middle East as an example, claiming that the reduction of tension in U.S.-Soviet relations "made possible"

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
12 JUNE 1974

- 2 -

the Syrian-Israeli disengagement agreement. In the same vein, a TASS report on Syrian President al-Asad's interview for American television on the 9th noted that he "highly appreciated" the process of relaxation of tension between the USSR and the United States, without mentioning his replies to questions on the President's forthcoming visit and Syrian-U.S. relations.

A blatant example of Moscow's efforts to avoid comment on the President's tour was provided by a Radio Peace and Progress broadcast in Arabic on the 10th. It analyzed what it described as an upsurge of U.S. press interest in the Arab world, demonstrated by visits to the area by a "big team of U.S. reporters" representing some 70 papers and magazines, but failed to mention that the journalists were covering the President's visit. The broadcast listed some factors which it asserted had "compelled" the United States to "introduce some changes" in its Mideast policy, such as an effort to rectify the mistakes of the Dulles era, the "consolidation" of Soviet-Arab ties, and the improvement in the international situation "due to" Soviet efforts for peace.

HANOI REACTS TO NIXON MIDDLE EAST TOUR, PLANNED SOVIET TRIP

Hanoi's predictable misgivings about President Nixon's visits to the Middle East and the Soviet Union have been reflected in articles by prominent North Vietnamese newspaper commentators warning of alleged U.S. duplicity and sinister motivations. The first available Hanoi reference to the Middle East tour came in a 3 June NHAN DAN article by Dieu Binh, a regular commentator on international affairs in the party paper. Dieu Binh noted that the Syrian-Israeli disengagement agreement had been reached just prior to the announcement that the President "is about to visit a number of countries in the Middle East." Hanoi's view of both Presidential tours seemed to be indicated in a 7 June article by Nguyen Huu Chinh, another NHAN DAN commentator on the international scene and U.S. policy, which criticized recent Administration official statements which it claimed were in preparation for the President's visit to "various countries." The Soviet trip was explicitly mentioned on the following day in a NHAN DAN report on Secretary of State Kissinger's 6 June press conference.

In 1972 Vietnamese communist media had studiously avoided explicit mention of the President's visits to Peking and Moscow, although they made their displeasure clear and even pointedly derided, without identifying, statements by the President during those trips. By

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
12 JUNE 1974

- 3 -

contrast, in step with Hanoi's own moves toward accommodation with the United States following the Paris peace agreement, North Vietnamese media had duly reported without comment Brezhnev's June 1973 visit to the United States. Unlike Hanoi, Liberation Radio ignored even the Brezhnev visit, and similarly it has not acknowledged the current Presidential tour--concealing the fact even while reporting derisively on Secretary Kissinger's 11 June press conference in Austria.

Dieu Binh's 3 June article stressed that the United States is pursuing its own unchanged interests in the Middle East and sarcastically questioned Kissinger's portrayal to the Arabs as "a friend, as a reliable and flexible negotiator who lives up to his promises," and as one who "brought about a radical change in U.S. foreign policy" by accepting a fair Arab-Israeli settlement as in the interests of the United States. Dieu Binh maintained that U.S. policy has not changed and that it still attempts to protect Israeli interests and divide the Arab states. The article was critical of Egypt's improvement of relations with the United States, but noted with approval continuing Syrian circumspection.

The 7 June article by Nguyen Huu Chinh criticized recent statements by the President and secretaries Kissinger and Schlesinger and denounced U.S. foreign policy as ambiguous and double-dealing. Chinh only referred directly to the President's Middle East tour in disparaging his planned visits to "various countries," but some of the author's comments seemed directed at the later trip to Moscow. Thus, he dismissed President Nixon's advocacy of detente with the USSR in his 5 June Annapolis speech, arguing that the President's words were belied by U.S. actions and policy. Chinh warned that the United States is "continuing to step up the arms race and war preparations in an attempt to achieve the military superiority that it lost" in Indochina. He endorsed the views of Soviet Marshal Grechko in this respect, citing his 4 June election speech statement that the "danger of war is a sad reality in our era" and that the Soviet Union must "maintain its vigilance and increase its military strength."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
12 JUNE 1974

- 4 -

EAST-WEST RELATIONS

GRECHKO, YEPISHEV DEFEND MILITARY PRIORITIES UNDER DETENTE

Soviet military leaders again appear to be on the defensive in the recurrent internal debate over military expenditures under detente. Defense Minister Grechko and Main Political Administration head Yepishev have notably borrowed from the debates of an earlier period in Soviet history to buttress their case that detente does not allow a shift of resources from the military sector, since defense planning must be based on "worst possible case" assumptions and not simply on the most probable course of events. This marks a new turn in the detente-defense debate, which first surfaced last year in the form of an obscure polemic couched in turgid doctrinal terms.*

YEPISHEV Yepishev, writing in KOMMUNIST No. 7, signed to press on 13 May, presented an unusually forthright statement of the military case in an article nominally keyed to the 29th anniversary of the victory over Germany in World War II. The reasons for the renewed expressions of concern from the military emerge most clearly from his article. Yepishev observed that "one cannot help but take into account that under conditions of detente someone might raise the question: is such attention to preparation of the population for armed defense of the Fatherland necessary, considering that a certain retreat of militarism has become apparent?" Yepishev rejected such a linkage, citing in support a comment by Lenin to the effect that "our steps toward peace must be accompanied by enhancement of our military preparedness."

In an article that argues vigorously for the role of military power in maintaining peace, Yepishev warned twice against "voluntary or involuntary underestimation of the military danger from imperialism." Granting that the international situation has improved, he countered that history has shown that "one must take into account not only the most probable course of events but also be prepared for possible unexpected reversals, dangerous provocations and adventures on the part of the most frantic enemies of socialism." Elsewhere Yepishev

* The issue emerged in the central press last summer when Col I. Sidelnikov complained in the 14 August RED STAR that some unnamed "military theorists and publicists" were reexamining Lenin's thesis that war is a continuation of policy in the light of the U.S.-Soviet prevention of nuclear war agreement. The early debate is discussed in "Soviet Debate over Role of Military Power During Detente," TRENDS SUPPLEMENT of 23 August 1973.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
12 JUNE 1974

- 5 -

warned in particular against the possibility that "madmen, capable of forgetting the lessons of history," could still come to power in the West. This formulation, a staple in the pronouncements of the Khrushchev period, has not been seen in recent years since Brezhnev last made reference to such "madmen" in speeches of October and November of 1967. Military spokesmen cited Brezhnev's remarks in the late 1960's to argue the need for continued vigilance.

GRECHKO Grechko and deputy Navy chief Kasatonov, in their Supreme Soviet election speeches, also cited Lenin's dictum on the indivisibility of the tasks of strengthening international security and strengthening the country's defenses, though only Kasatonov, as reported in SOVIET ESTONIA of 24 May, attributed the thesis to Lenin. Grechko, speaking on 4 June, went on to warn in terms identical to Yepishev's that Soviet foreign policy "must not only be cognizant of the most likely course of events but must also remain prepared for the most unexpected reversals, dangerous provocations and adventures on the part of the enemies of socialism and peace." He cautioned against "complacency" in the face of the continuing "material preparation for war" in the West.

So far no political figure has offered public support for Grechko and Yepishev in their new line of argumentation on detente-defense issues. Internal security chief Andropov seemed to be presenting the opposite case, however, in his election speech on 5 June. As reported in the central press on the 6th, Andropov played down the need for concern about the continuing opposition to detente in the West, arguing that Western leaders had little choice but to accept the realities of the new international situation. In Andropov's words, "real changes in the correlation of forces inevitably bring forth changes in the views of people and in the minds of politicians." In an award ceremony speech in Estonia at the turn of the year, Andropov had also made an exceptionally strong case for detente.

The use of formulas from the past to justify continued defense priorities was also evident in a review of Grechko's new book, "The Armed Forces of the Land of the Soviets," in the 29 May PRAVDA. N. Kuzmin, in an otherwise brief and generalized review of the book, cited remarks that Brezhnev had made in a June 1966 Supreme Soviet election speech, though the reviewer failed to give the date of the citation. Brezhnev had noted that Moscow, in taking "necessary measures" to equip the armed forces, had been compelled to spend scarce funds on defense, but that "the people understand and support this." Brezhnev had made the statement in the context of arguing that "the situation still does not permit us" to accelerate economic development by "dropping from our shoulders at least part of the [defense] load." Suslov had made the same point in his 1966 election speech a few days earlier.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
12 JUNE 1974

- 6 -

BACKGROUND Brezhnev's evocation of "madmen" in the fall of 1967 came hard on the heels of the September announcement that in the following year light industry was scheduled to grow at a faster rate than heavy industry for the first time in the post-Khrushchev period. It thus seemed designed, like his 1966 election speech remarks, to frustrate efforts to draw the resources for that shift from the military sector. Yepishev, in resurrecting the formula, and Kuzmin, in going back to 1966 for an appropriate quotation from Brezhnev, may have wished to recall the circumstances of this earlier debate over resources in which Brezhnev stood squarely on the side of the military, a debate whose resolution was presumably responsible for the continued rapid expansion of Soviet forces during the next several years.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
12 JUNE 1974

- 7 -

EUROPE

USSR, ALLIES REJECT CSCE PESSIMISM, SUGGEST DELAYED SUMMIT

Against the background of speculation in the West that the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) may be stalemated over the USSR's refusal to meet basic Western demands on humanitarian issues ("basket three" of the agenda), Moscow and its orthodox allies have maintained a show of confidence that the talks are proceeding satisfactorily and that a sincere effort by all concerned will bring the talks to a successful conclusion. While Soviet bloc spokesmen have continued to press for a summit-level concluding session of the conference, they have become less insistent that the concluding session be held this summer. They have also stressed that the conference should be regarded as the beginning of a process, rather than the end, suggesting that Moscow may regard the symbolic value of a formal conference conclusion an acceptable preliminary result, apart from whatever specific agreements may be achieved.

VAGUENESS ON TIMING,
OBJECTIVES

Soviet spokesmen and commentators since the April recess have continued to insist that the talks should be concluded by a summit-level meeting, but they have become increasingly vague about its timing. Reflecting this trend, statements by Soviet leaders Kosygin and Kirilenko on 28 May, Katushev on the 30th, and a PRAVDA editorial on the 29th called for a summit meeting without the usual time specifications--"at the earliest date," "as soon as possible," or "in the near future." But Foreign Minister Gromyko on 10 June included the phrase "in the near future," the first such specification by a Soviet elite-level spokesman since the beginning of May.

Along with this increasing vagueness as to timing, Soviet spokesmen have become less specific as to the substance of the agreements they anticipate. Instead they have stressed the importance of a formal conclusion of the conference, seeming to suggest that the conclusion of the conference would have a symbolic significance entirely apart from the specific agreements it might ratify.

This suggestion that Moscow may be satisfied with something less than full satisfaction of its demands at the security conference is reflected most clearly in Gromyko's 10 June electoral speech. According to a TASS summary of the speech, Gromyko asserted that

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

12 JUNE 1974

- 8 -

the conference is "not the end-all of life and politics in European affairs. Much work still has to be done so that Europe should become a continent of durable peace and cooperation." This formulation, which has the effect of lessening the importance of the conference, may be interpreted as a new wording of the statement in the Warsaw Pact's Political Consultative Committee communique of 19 April, which said that the conference was "not a goal in itself" but "a starting point of the historic work to build new relations between all the states of the European continent." Moscow radio commentator Vladlen Kuznetsov, in a broadcast carried four days before Gromyko's speech, said much the same thing in more direct form:

Moreover, even if the results of the conference should be confined to one act, that is, the codification of the results of World War II and postwar developments on an all-European basis and with the participation of the United States and Canada, this would in itself be an act of truly historic significance.

POSSIBLE ADJOURNMENT Moscow commentators have noted only in passing Western speculation that certain West European states may seek an adjournment of the conference until September, when phase two would then be continued, in order to reassess the entire CSCE situation--a suggestion prompted by Moscow's failure to move ahead on "basket three" after having indicated that its major demand had been met by the West's agreement to the inviolability of borders principle. However, Hungary's Deputy Foreign Minister Nagy on 30 May hinted in a unique statement that the socialist states could live with such a delay. While asserting that the socialist countries would still prefer that the closing session in Helsinki be held in July at the summit level and reiterating the bloc's adamant stand on "basket three," Nagy declared, according to NEPSZABADZAG on the 31st, that "those who think the socialist states are prepared to pay any price at all for" such a summit in Helsinki "are seriously mistaken." He added:

In any case, whether it is a question of a few weeks or a few months is not the essence of the matter; rather it is the fact that the concept of European security is profoundly approved by the public opinion of both East and West. A great responsibility would be assumed by those who, realizing this, would try to abort or protractedly delay the convocation of the third phase.

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
12 JUNE 1974

- 9 -

Some East European commentators have pointed out that a Helsinki summit would be an excellent opportunity for all the new West European leaders to meet their counterparts. At the same time, comment has criticized alleged attempts in the West to exploit the recent governmental changes as a means to delay the final session.

The Polish leaders have even gone so far as to try to preempt the decision on the form of the final session by declaring that they would attend. Premier Jaroszewicz was reported by PAP on 6 May as saying that the "party and state leadership are determined to participate personally in the third stage." This statement of intent has since been interpreted in the Polish press and by Foreign Minister Olszowski as a virtual fait accompli, with the implied meaning that other countries' leaders should get on the bandwagon.

INFLUENCE OF SUMMIT

Linking prospects for a breakthrough at the CSCE talks with President Nixon's imminent visit to the USSR, East German leader Honecker, in an interview with the Associated Press published in NEUES DEUTSCHLAND on the 4th, asserted that there were still "real possibilities" for concluding the conference in July. He said he based his "optimism" on the resumption of the Brezhnev-Nixon dialog. Moscow has publicized the statement widely and has drawn particular attention to Honecker's optimistic prediction. Moscow radio summarized the interview, TASS included the Honecker speculation in its long summary of the interview, and PRAVDA, on the 5th, carrying only a brief summary of the interview, highlighted the passage linking the Moscow summit to the success of the conference.

MOSCOW MINIMIZES EC MINISTERS' AGREEMENTS, STRESSES PROBLEMS

Moscow has provided a mixed appraisal of the series of EC ministerial meetings held 4-11 June, noting that decisions were reached on several contentious issues, but stressing that these achievements occurred in a setting of persistent EC problems. Typical in this regard was an R. Puchkov commentary in PRAVDA on 8 June which, in reviewing results of the EC foreign ministers meeting on 4 June, asserted that decisions by the EC are reached "against the background of acute differences characteristic of the situation in the Common Market." In commenting on specific aspects of the recent round of EC meetings, Moscow has paid special attention to Britain's request for renegotiation of the terms of its membership, the issue of EC-Arab discussions, and the question of U.S.-EC consultations.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL
TRENDS
12 JUNE 1974

- 10 -

BRITISH MEMBERSHIP Soviet commentators have noted that Britain's current position on whether to remain in the EC, as outlined in Foreign Secretary Callaghan's speech to the EC Council on 4 June, is more moderate and conciliatory than the position Callaghan expressed to the same forum two months earlier.* Generally interpreting this shift as reassurance by Britain to its EC partners that it wants to remain an EC member, Soviet comment has accused the Labor government of renegeing on its election promises to achieve fundamental revisions in the terms of Britain's EC membership and to hold a national referendum on the results. Moscow has continued this line of criticism in its initial reaction to an 11 June House of Commons debate on EC membership. TASS correspondent V. Vasilets commented on 12 June, for instance, that Callaghan's remarks during the debate suggest the government would accept "partial concessions" from its EC partners but that the debate showed a divided Labor Party and continued widespread opposition in Britain to the Common Market.

EC-ARAB DISCUSSIONS Soviet and East European commentators have been quick to point out that the EC decision on discussions with the Arabs touches an old sore point in EC-U.S. relations. In reporting the announcement on 10 June of the EC foreign ministers' decision to propose that a dialog be opened with 20 Arab countries to promote improved economic and political cooperation, Moscow has offered little initial comment, but it has noted that developing such a dialog would require time to work out and that it may encounter opposition from the United States. An East German radio broadcast on 11 June, while remaining noncommittal on the desirability of EC-Arab discussions, emphasized that the United States had objected to such an approach when it was proposed in the EC several months ago, preferring that a larger collective of oil-producing nations than the EC Nine meet with the Arab countries. The broadcast continued that the EC decision announced on 10 June "cannot have been to the liking of the United States." TASS on 8 June had carried a brief summary of a New York TIMES article which alleged that the United States had warned the EC states against developing an EC-Arab dialog because it would expose the EC countries to intense Arab political pressures.

U.S.-EC CONSULTATIONS Moscow's initial reaction to the EC decision on 10 June to establish procedures for closer and timely consultations with Washington during

* For Moscow's initial reaction to the British request, see the TRENDS for 10 April 1974, pp. 4-5.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
12 JUNE 1974

- 11 -

EC decision-making processes has been limited, but appears to be in line with past Soviet treatment of U.S.-EC relations that stressed a disparity and divergence of national interests. A TASS report of the press conference held on 11 June by the current chairman of the EC Council of Ministers, FRG Foreign Minister Genscher, referred briefly to the question of U.S.-EC consultations but mentioned only Genscher's remark that to hold such consultations would require the unanimous consent of all members. An East German broadcast on 11 June added that Genscher had stressed that U.S.-EC consultations should not be a "one-way street" and that the EC states assumed they would likewise be informed of U.S. decision-making. Moscow apparently did not anticipate the EC decision on U.S.-EC consultations, to judge from a TASS report early on 10 June by commentator V. Osipov. Recalling that previous attempts by the EC to agree on this issue had been blocked by France because consultations would be "tantamount to subjecting the Common Market to U.S. diktat," Osipov predicted that "France has no intention of changing its attitude on this issue at the present meeting."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
12 JUNE 1974

- 12 -

COMMUNIST RELATIONS

MOSCOW, EAST EUROPEANS STEP UP PRESSURE FOR WORLD CONFERENCE

Moscow's recently more direct support for a new international communist party conference was clearly in evidence in a 10 June election speech in Kalinin by Ponomarev, CPSU Politburo candidate member and secretary in charge of relations with nonruling communist parties. Noting that "many fraternal parties have come out lately with initiatives to hold new large scale international forums," Ponomarev declared that "supporting these ideas to the full, our party . . . welcomes these initiatives and undoubtedly will take the most active part in their implementation." This statement, which appeared toward the end of the Moscow domestic service report of the speech, was placed at the beginning of the TASS English report the same day. An authoritative 5 June PRAVDA editorial article, pegged to the fifth anniversary of the start of the 1969 Moscow conference, had been somewhat less direct in registering Moscow's support for "new collective steps" aimed at consolidating the world movement.*

Where Soviet pronouncements have been vague on the degree of support for a new world conference, Poland's Gierek, speaking at a Warsaw rally on the 8th in honor of the GDR's Honecker, declared flatly that the "great majority" of parties back a new world conference, as well as a prior conference of European CP's. Support for a conference, while not echoed by Honecker at the Warsaw rally, was duly recorded in the 9 June joint communique issued at the end of Honecker's visit to Poland.

Like PRAVDA, the leading party dailies of Moscow's orthodox East European allies carried editorials or major articles on the occasion of the fifth anniversary of the opening of the 1969 conference. And on the 6th these papers published extensive reviews of the 5 June PRAVDA editorial article. The 1969 conference anniversary has been ignored so far by the Romanians, who attended that gathering but consistently oppose a new conference convened for the purpose of criticizing "any one party"--the Chinese. On the eve of the anniversary, an Ilyin commentary broadcast by Moscow radio only in Romanian on the 4th reminded Bucharest that, in view of the "new situation" as compared to 1969, "experience itself will suggest new and important initiatives for the cohesion and mobilization of the world communist movement forces."

* See the TRENDS of 5 June, pages 10-11.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
12 JUNE 1974

- 13 -

HUNGARIAN ARTICLE While the East European commemorative articles generally included pro forma reiterations of earlier endorsements of a new European and world party conference, Hungary's NEPSZABADSAG additionally took an unmistakable slap at the Romanians for their implacable attitude toward a new world gathering. Repeating some of the phraseology used in an article by Ferenc Varnai in the 4 April NEPSZABADSAG, the paper's 5 June editorial article voiced disagreement with "those who fear that their parties' independence may be jeopardized" by a conference. It further echoed Varnai in asserting that independence means each party's determination of how it will serve the common cause, that those who serve their own goals are "no internationalists," and that "no single party" can decisively influence world developments.

The editorial went beyond the Varnai article in denouncing "neutrality" and "appeasement" in the fight against Maoism. It also explicitly dismissed Bucharest's condition that it would only attend if "all" parties participated, recalling that the 1969 conference--attended by 75 of the 89 world communist parties recognized by Moscow--proved that such a gathering can strengthen unity "even if all sister parties are not present." The tougher stance toward the Romanian position was further in evidence in the 5 June NEPSZABADSAG editorial article's failure to reiterate Varnai's assurances that there was no "center" or leading party in the movement, and that there was no intention to use a new conference to excommunicate Peking.

The Hungarian stance on the position of maverick parties seemed to stand in contrast to that of the 5 June PRAVDA editorial article itself. PRAVDA, perhaps to reassure parties still cool toward new collective ventures, adopted a more conciliatory posture on the acceptability of diversity within an anti-imperialist coalition which echoed the guidelines issuing from a March conference of Soviet, East European and Mongolian party theoreticians held in Moscow under the auspices of the CPSU Central Committee's Institute of Marxism-Leninism.* PRAVDA acknowledged that "disagreements on individual, sometimes even substantial and acute problems, do not bar the way to achieving unity on essential questions of the struggle against imperialism."

* For details on the March conference, see the following article.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
12 JUNE 1974

- 14 -

MOSCOW REDISCOVERS "DIFFERENT ROADS TO SOCIALISM" DOCTRINE

At a 12-13 March meeting in Moscow at the Institute of Marxism-Leninism, party theoreticians from the Soviet Union, East Europe and Mongolia discussed new political guidelines emphasizing cooperative relations between socialist states and diversity in national forms of political, economic and social organization. The participants in the discussion, which was summarized in the May issue of QUESTIONS OF CPSU HISTORY, stressed the urgency of developing effective and, above all, responsive mechanisms for coping with deep-rooted historical diversities in their respective nations. Without mentioning the doctrine of "different roads to socialism" made familiar in the Khrushchev era, the conferees uniformly argued that "unity" in the socialist world--i.e., political stability--could only be maintained by encouraging national diversity.

UNITY THROUGH DIVERSITY The Moscow meeting, termed an "international scientific-theoretical symposium," was attended by party theoreticians from the Institute of Marxism-Leninism and its counterparts in Mongolia and all East European countries except Yugoslavia. The discussion was notable for its repeated references to "creative development" of Marxism-Leninism and its "enrichment with new basic theses." In this respect, as well as in the candid though cautious treatment of sensitive political issues by the discussants, the March meeting was a far cry from the orthodoxy and crypticism which characterized the 18-19 December Moscow international conference of communist party secretaries on "ideological cooperation" and the 7-9 January Prague conference commemorating 15 years of publication of the journal PROBLEMS OF PEACE AND SOCIALISM.

The central theme of the discussion, which was opened by the new director of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism, Anatoliy Yegorov, was the need to determine what forms of political, economic and social development were suited to the varying needs of different socialist states. Yegorov and other speakers took pains to cite the authority of Lenin for the notion that "unity" among socialist states would not be undermined but would be "guaranteed by diversity in details, in local peculiarities and in methods of approaching the cause." In laying stress on this theme, Yegorov and a colleague at the institute, S. V. Aleksandrov, reiterated a rarely used Leninist dictum that the "revolutionary class must be prepared for the most rapid and unexpected change from one form [of social or political activity] to another"--a statement emphasizing the great urgency of official responsiveness to societal problems.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
12 JUNE 1974

- 15 -

The urgency of finding more effective forms of accommodation between state and society ran like a red thread through the discussion. While paying lip service to the common denominators of socialist unity, speaker after speaker stressed the need to pay heed to their respective national "peculiarities"--in economic development, historical traditions, and ethnic culture.

The overriding concern over ways and means of insuring social stability was later expressed more openly by a CPSU Central Committee functionary, F. F. Petrenko, in the April issue of QUESTIONS OF CPSU HISTORY, which also directed a thinly veiled attack at Brezhnev. It is also noteworthy that following the Moscow meeting, Yegorov briefed Kurt Hager, GDR secretary for ideology, in East Berlin on 24 April, and two weeks later, on 14 May, Hager authored an article in PRAVDA which endorsed a familiar revisionist thesis of the Khrushchev era--the primacy of economics over politics--in keeping with the main theme of the March meeting in Moscow.

Apart from its international implications, the Moscow meeting in March was notable also for its domestic implications. The identification of Yegorov as director of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism as early as 12 March--he had previously been identified in this post on 16 April--suggests that he had a hand in the remarkable public attack on Brezhnev made by CPSU Central Committee official F. F. Petrenko.* The Petrenko attack appeared in the April issue of a journal under Yegorov's direct supervision, QUESTIONS OF CPSU HISTORY, in an issue prepared for the printers on 28 February - 1 March and sent to press on 28 March.**

* For background on Yegorov, see the TRENDS Supplement of 29 May 1974, "The Struggle for Change in Soviet Social Sciences."

** For background, see the TRENDS of 30 May 1974, pages 23-29. For a more recent Petrenko attack, see the USSR section of this issue of TRENDS.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FMIS TRENDS
12 JUNE 1974

- 16 -

VIETNAM

KISSINGER'S REMARKS ON VIETNAM DRAW "COMMENTATOR" ARTICLE

Secretary Kissinger's recent testimony before U.S. House and Senate committees on the foreign aid bill and his 6 June press conference remarks on the withdrawal of U.S. civilian personnel from South Vietnam have prompted authoritative and high-level responses from Vietnamese communist media. In addition to a sizeable volume of routine Hanoi and Front comment, reaction has included DRV Foreign Ministry protests condemning the United States for "increased military aid" to Saigon and for "not yet fulfilling its commitment to contribute to healing the wounds of war" in the DRV, and a wide-ranging NHAN DAN "Commentator" article--the first since December--summing up these earlier complaints and attacking Kissinger for what was termed his "betrayal" of U.S. commitments.

Hanoi's reacting to Kissinger in the form of an article under the now rarely used but highly authoritative byline of Commentator suggests that the Secretary's latest statements may have touched an especially raw nerve in the Hanoi hierarchy. Commentator accused the Secretary of advancing "roundabout arguments" in his efforts to "quickly" obtain congressional endorsement of the pending GVN aid bill and of "freely" interpreting important provisions of the Paris agreement at his 6 June press conference. According to the article, Kissinger's arguments were "at variance with the spirit of many provisions" of the agreement he negotiated and initialed. Contending that the Nixon Administration has "openly publicized" policy that is "at variance" with what it has pledged to implement, Commentator specifically cited "continued military aid" to Thieu, "refusal to withdraw all military personnel disguised as civilians," and "refusal" to implement Article 21 of the Paris agreement--the article that sets forth U.S. intentions to provide aid for DRV reconstruction.

Deploing U.S. "justification" for its "wrongdoing," the article claimed that Kissinger described the U.S. commitment to the GVN as "ethical and political, not to mention a legal commitment" and that the Nixon Administration has "arrogantly" said the Paris agreement constitutes a "new basis" for the United States to prolong its commitments to Saigon. A 6 June "feature" broadcast

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
12 JUNE 1974

- 17 -

by Hanoi differed from this interpretation in alleging that "at present" Kissinger had "changed his tune" with regard to the U.S. commitment to give aid to Saigon: that is, he no longer contended, as he had in his letter to Senator Kennedy, that the commitment originated from the Paris agreement. Instead, the broadcast quoted Kissinger as saying U.S. assistance to the GVN was based not on legal commitments but on political and more moral ones, and it described this as a "step backward" for the Secretary.

Lashing out at Secretary Kissinger for his "habit of casting blame on others," Commentator declared that the secretary "fabricated such stories" about North Vietnam maintaining "substantial military forces" in the South and about the North "waging war and preparing for a large-scale offensive" in order to justify supplying Saigon with the means of self-defense. The article disdainfully discounted these "shopworn allegations" as similar to those Kissinger "had to take back" during the Paris negotiations.

Responding to Secretary Kissinger's 6 June press conference statement discounting the force of private unilateral statements of intention, Commentator avoided confirming that there were any unwritten U.S. understandings with the DRV. After briefly summarizing the Secretary's view that unwritten understandings cannot be considered in the same category as written agreements, Commentator asked rhetorically what he meant by that and promptly pointed out that a U.S. State Department spokesman had previously said the U.S. government had no secret commitments to North Vietnam on the withdrawal of U.S. civilians from the South or on U.S. reconstruction aid for the North. Contemptuously characterizing these as "cunning, ambiguous" statements that cannot "conceal the vile, crooked U.S. trick," the article noted that these issues are covered by the "written provisions" of the Paris agreement. As a result of these statements, Commentator concluded, Kissinger has, as representative of the United States in negotiations on Vietnam and in signing the Paris agreements and the 13 June joint communique, "betrayed. . . the U.S. commitments and his own signature."

BACKGROUND ON COMMENTATOR

During the war years, NHAN DAN Commentator articles were the consistent vehicle for Hanoi's comment on U.S. policy and on major Presidential pronouncements. Since the 1973 peace agreement only two Commentator articles have been released--a 7 April 1973 article carrying an unusually argumentative attack against the Nixon Doctrine and an 8 December article responding to a Kissinger press conference assertion that the South Vietnamese

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
12 JUNE 1974

- 18 -

conflict was a civil war.* While neither of these articles addressed themselves directly to U.S.-DRV negotiations, they were shortly followed by the 11 May and 13 December announcements of forthcoming Kissinger-Le Duc Tho talks in Paris.

PRG AGREES TO RESUME PARTICIPATION IN JMC TALKS

The PRG military delegation to the Joint Military Commission (JMC) reacted favorably to Saigon's restoration of certain PRG "privileges and immunities" by agreeing to end its suspension of participation in the JMC talks.** First announced at an 8 June press conference held by the PRG delegation and followed up by a PRG Foreign Ministry statement of the 10th, the PRG response made no explicit commitment to return to the PRG-GVN consultative conference at La Celle-Saint-Cloud, although the foreign ministry statement asserted the PRG was ready to resume negotiations there as well once Saigon had met its "minimum, just, and necessary demands." The foreign ministry statement declared the PRG delegation would be attending both the two-party and four-party JMC meetings to give Saigon an opportunity to demonstrate a "serious attitude" toward present negotiations.

An 11 June DRV Foreign Ministry statement supporting the PRG move failed to spell out DRV intentions with regard to its own withdrawal from the four-party talks, but VNA on the 12th cited a note from the DRV delegation indicating it would participate in the next four-party JMC meeting. Underscoring the communist context on that Saigon's "acceptance of a number of legitimate demands" did not constitute a "sign of goodwill," an 11 June NHAN DAN commentary charged that Saigon still "refuses to ensure all the immunities and privileges of the PRG and DRV delegations as stipulated in the Paris agreement."

* For discussions of the previous two Commentator articles, see the TRENDS of 12 December 1973, pages 9-10, and the TRENDS of 11 April 1973, pages 5-7.

** The PRG broke off negotiations with the GVN at the two-party JMC talks on 10 May, allegedly for Saigon's unwillingness to respect the PRG delegation's diplomatic status, and announced on the 13th that it was also suspending sine die its participation in the bilateral talks in France as well. On 30 May the PRG and DRV also announced withdrawal of their participation in the four-party JMC talks. For the last discussion of the breakdown in negotiations, see the TRENDS of 30 May 1974, pages 12-13.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
12 JUNE 1974

- 19 -

CUSTOMARY CELEBRATIONS MARK PRG FIFTH ANNIVERSARY

VIETNAM The fifth anniversary of the founding of the PRG was marked on 5 June in Quang Tri Province in South Vietnam and in Hanoi with public ceremonies that closely paralleled those held last year, and with a PRG Council of Ministers session-- customarily convened in conjunction with the anniversary--on the 3d and 4th. Liberation Radio on the 6th reported that President Huynh Tan Phat presided over and delivered the main address at the Council of Ministers meeting held at an unspecified location in the "liberated area."*

In the presence of a low-level DRV delegation headed by Vice Premier Phan Trong Tue, diplomatic representatives, and visiting "international delegations," the Quang Tri anniversary meeting heard NFLSV Chairman Nguyen Huu Tho give the major speech--a function first performed by Tho a last year's ceremonies when he replaced Huynh Tan Phat, who had in previous years been the main speaker.** Chairman Tho routinely reviewed the "victories" achieved by the PRG over the United States and in preserving peace and protecting the Paris agreement since its signing 16 months ago and voiced standard complaints about U.S. and Saigon efforts to "continue the war." To cope with the "dark schemes" of the United States and its "henchmen," Nguyen Huu Tho laid down the following "urgent tasks":

Strengthening the people's solidarity bloc; and persisting in and accelerating the struggle on the political, military, and diplomatic fronts to force the U.S. imperialists and the Saigon administration to respect and seriously implement the Paris agreement. . . .

Hanoi's attention to the 6 June PRG anniversary consisted of the traditional congratulatory messages sent to Nguyen Huu Tho and Huynh Tan Phat by DRV President Ton Duc Thang, Chairman of the

* The "early-1974 session" of the PRG Council of Ministers--held 5 and 6 February--was only belatedly reported by Liberation Radio on 22 February, when it released a final communique. No such communique has been monitored to date for the recent session. The June 1973 Council of Ministers session was discussed in the TRENDS of 13 June 1973, pages 8-10.

** See the TRENDS of 6 June 1973, pages 4-6, for a discussion of the fourth anniversary celebrations.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
12 JUNE 1974

- 20 -

National Assembly Standing Committee Truong Chinh, and Premier Pham Van Dong; NHAN DAN and QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorials recounting the "successes" of the PRG; and a 5 June Hanoi "grand meeting" attended by Politburo members Nguyen Duy Trinh and Hoang Van Hoan. The major remarks at the meeting were delivered by Trinh and the head of the PRG special representation in the DRV, Nguyen Van Tien, who also shared the speaker's platform at last year's meeting. Truong Chinh, the top leader present last year, had not returned from his visit to Hungary in time for this year's meeting.

In cataloging U.S. efforts to "deny the existence" of the PRG, Trinh accused the United States of continued military involvement in the South and claimed that U.S. authorities were "striving to legalize" this involvement and "brazenly distorting" the Paris agreement--considering it a "new political and legal basis" to continue and prolong the commitment to Thieu. "This," Trinh said, "is the chief cause of the present serious situation and of all the suffering and disasters of our southern people."

Trinh introduced a new formulation in discussing the problem of normalizing relations between North and South Vietnam. According to Trinh, "normal relations between the North and South will be achieved through bloodsealed ties between the DRV Government and the PRG." Previously Hanoi has argued that the peace agreement envisages such "normalization" only after the formation of a new administration in the South. Thus, for example, a Hanoi radio commentary on 29 January rejecting a Saigon proposal for GVN-DRV negotiations on normalization maintained that North-South talks must follow the implementation of political aspects of the peace agreement, including general elections to "set up general authoritative agencies for the entire South."

Trinh had reflected this conventional sequence in his speech last year, when he foresaw his "southern compatriots" holding general elections, "normalizing relations between the South and North, and gradually achieving peaceful reunification of the fatherland." Nguyen Huu Tho's anniversary speech this year followed the usual line in declaring that Thieu had "no right" to represent the South Vietnamese people in negotiations with the DRV aimed at reestablishing normal North-South relations.

PRC As in the past years, Peking's observance of the PRG anniversary was highlighted by a leadership message on the 5th signed by PRC Acting Chairman Tung Pi-wu and Premier Chou En-lai, a PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial on the 6th, and a reception given that day by the PRG ambassador

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
12 JUNE 1974

- 21 -

which occasioned a high-level Chinese leadership turnout. Vice Chairman Yeh Chien-ying led Chinese officials at the reception and Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei spoke for the Chinese side, a step down from the pattern of the past two years, when Chou led the Chinese delegation and Yeh and Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien were Chinese spokesmen.

In contrast with last year's glowing praise for the "victory" of the Paris agreement, this year's Chinese comment reflected the recent upswing in Vietnam battle action and the impasse in negotiating sessions, calling attention to the present "tense" situation caused by allied violations. Peking carefully softpedaled criticism of the United States and focused on Saigon for the bulk of its invective, accusing Washington only in general terms of violating the agreement and backing Saigon's "sabotage." Peking's last authoritative comment on Vietnam, a 21 May PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article seconding Vietnamese protests, had gone further by condemning specific U.S. violations of the peace agreement. Though noting that the United States and Saigon have met with "strong condemnation" abroad for their actions, Peking avoided an explicit sanction in its own name and did not directly demand that the United States and Saigon abide by the Paris accord. Peking's last authoritative call for U.S.-Saigon implementation came in an 8 December 1973 PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article released just before the La Duc Tho-Kissinger talks that month.

While calling attention to peace violations, the Chinese carefully sustained their sanguine assessment of the overall direction of Vietnam developments, declaring in the PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial that the situation "is continuing to develop in a direction favorable to the people." Peking expressed confidence that though a "tortuous and complex" road lies ahead, the PRG will eventually overcome all difficulties. Reiterating support for the PRG as the "sole" legal government of South Vietnam and backing for the PRG six-point proposal, the Chinese reaffirmed Sino-Vietnamese solidarity as members of "the same family" and noted Peking's "internationalist duty" to support its ally. Like last year, there was no reference to Chinese "assistance" for the Vietnamese struggle.

USSR Soviet comment on the PRG anniversary exemplified Moscow's shift during the past year toward more forthright support of its Vietnamese allies. The anniversary was observed with more fanfare than last year, including a "South Vietnamese Patriots Solidarity Week" beginning on 4 June, and with greater invective aimed at alleged Saigon violations of the peace accord and U.S.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
12 JUNE 1974

- 22 -

support for the GVN. The 6 June anniversary message from Brezhnev, Podgornyy, and Kosygin reflected the tougher line of recent months, referring to "flagrant and systematic violations" by the Saigon regime and calling on the Thieu administration and "the foreign forces patronizing it" to "embark on a path of realism and adopt a positive attitude" toward the PRG's 22 March proposals for a political settlement in South Vietnam. Last year's salutation from the Kremlin leadership was far more moderate in tone: Emphasizing the "victory" won through the peace agreement, it had not mentioned either Saigon violations or U.S. support for Thieu, and had failed to endorse the PRG's political program or its continuing "struggle."

Moscow press comment on the anniversary, including a 5 June RED STAR article by Leontyev, echoed other Soviet commentaries in recent months in directly criticizing U.S. military aid to Saigon. The commentaries routinely praised PRG achievements in the "liberated areas" and its "increasing international prestige."

The "solidarity week" accompanying the PRG anniversary, like a campaign held on the anniversary in 1972, was marked with nationwide cultural and social activities. Moscow's more subdued celebration of the 1973 anniversary had not occasioned such a solidarity week. This year's anniversary also prompted the usual Moscow ceremonial meeting--on the 4th--and a PRG embassy reception the following day, both attended by candidate Politburo member P. N. Demichev. An official of the same rank had attended the embassy reception last year, but Soviet representation at the 1973 meeting had been at a slightly lower level with a delegation headed by the chairwoman of the Soviet of Nationalities of the Supreme Soviet, Y. Nasriddinova.

Evident PRG appreciation for Moscow's increasing support seemed reflected in a gratuitous message from the PRG/NFLSV leaders to Brezhnev, Podgornyy, and Kosygin greeting them on the opening of the Soviet solidarity week. The message, broadcast by Vietnamese communist media on the 2d, expressed gratitude for the Soviet Union's "increasingly strong, great, and efficient support for the Vietnamese people's revolutionary undertaking." It particularly acclaimed Soviet backing for the 22 March PRG six-point proposal--the third such PRG proposal since the Paris agreement, but the first to receive authoritative Soviet endorsement. Soviet solidarity campaigns in previous years are not known to have prompted such messages from the PRG.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
12 JUNE 1974

- 23 -

TRUONG CHINH DELEGATION CONCLUDES VISITS IN EAST EUROPE

A DRV National Assembly delegation led by Assembly Standing Committee Chairman and Politburo member Truong Chinh returned to Hanoi on 11 June after a four-week journey that included extended stays in Czechoslovakia and Hungary. This was the first North Vietnamese parliamentary group tour since the one led by Standing Committee Vice Chairman Hoang Van Hoan in late summer 1971.* The Truong Chinh delegation was welcomed home at the Hanoi airport by high-level officials, including Le Duan, who was absent at the group's departure on 14 May.

En route to Prague the Vietnamese stopped at Peking, where they were met and feted by PRC National People's Congress Standing Committee Vice Chairman Hsu Hsiang-chien and other Chinese officials. The Peking stop en route this year was much shorter and more perfunctory than Hoang Van Hoan's stopover in 1971, when he held talks with Chou En-lai. The delegation also stopped in Moscow on 15 May and was greeted by the chairwoman of the USSR Supreme Soviet's Soviet of Nationalities, Y. Nasriddinova, among others.

Arriving in Prague on 14 May for a week's visit, the DRV delegation was hosted by Truong Chinh's Czechoslovak National Assembly counterpart, Alois Indra, who had invited the DRV delegation during a Czechoslovak assembly delegation's Hanoi visit in April 1973. The DRV delegation's visit included routine tours and ceremonies as well as a meeting with Czechoslovak party leader Husak and Premier Strougal.

The DRV assemblymen arrived in Hungary on 23 May for a 15-day visit and were met by an official delegation headed by Truong Chinh's counterpart, A. Apro. During the group's stay it met with party head Janos Kadar and President Pal Losonczi and went on an unexceptional tour, much like the one in Czechoslovakia. Coverage of the delegation's activities in Hungary by both the Hanoi and Budapest media was scant, especially during the second week.

The delegation's return to Hanoi through Moscow and Peking involved stopovers very similar to the outbound stops in terms of the official USSR and Chinese turnout. However, NCNA reported a meeting between the North Vietnamese and Cambodian Prince Sihanouk on 9 June and one with RGNU Prime Minister Penn Nouth on 10 June.

* The Hoang Van Hoan trip was discussed in the TRENDS of 6 October 1971, pages 11-13.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
12 JUNE 1974

- 24 -

PRC FOREIGN RELATIONS

PEKING VIEWS FAVORABLY U.S. POLICY PRIOR TO MOSCOW SUMMIT

Implicitly anticipating President Nixon's Moscow summit visit in late June, Peking has taken pains in recent comment to highlight evidence of the U.S. commitment to improve relations with China, while at the same time displaying obvious approval of what it views as the Nixon Administration's continued firmness in dealing with Moscow on critical East-West issues. This attitude was apparent in a 7 June NCNA report of an address by Secretary Kissinger on 3 June which cited Kissinger's assurance that the Administration has a firm commitment to improve relations with Peking and that this stance is a "permanent and essential element" in U.S. foreign policy enjoying great "bipartisan support." Such coverage, marking the first time in a year that Peking has gone out of its way to originate a detailed report on a high-level U.S. official's remarks on Sino-U.S. relations, was occasioned by Kissinger's speech at a dinner given by the National Council for U.S.-China Trade, the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations, and the Committee on Scholarly Communication with the PRC.* Despite evidence of a debate in China in recent months over Peking's trade and cultural interchanges with the West, NCNA also freely quoted Kissinger's statement that "commercial, scholarly, artistic and athletic exchanges" promoted by the three host organizations have added to bilateral understanding and given "immeasurable strength" to the process of normalization of relations.

In contrast to its equivocal and discreet handling of U.S.-Soviet issues prior to the two previous Nixon-Brezhnev summit sessions, for this June's summit Peking has recently carried a series of articles detailing continued superpower rivalry and emphasizing U.S. determination, especially over strategic arms negotiations and the Middle East.** The change seems to reflect PRC confidence

* The last occurrence was a 29 May 1973 NCNA article citing President Nixon's and Kissinger's remarks on meeting a visiting PRC journalist delegation in Washington. NCNA's 13 November 1973 report on Kissinger's remarks at a reciprocal banquet in Peking, in which he referred to U.S. determination to improve bilateral relations, merely followed customary diplomatic courtesy and practice for such high-level visitors to Peking.

** For background see TRENDS of 30 May 1974, pages 8-9, and 5 June 1974 pages 4-5.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
12 JUNE 1974

- 25 -

that no agreements contrary to Chinese interests are likely to be reached in Moscow. Most recently, a 6 June NCNA article heralded President Nixon's upcoming Middle East trip as a show of U.S. strength prior to the Moscow summit. The report noted that the visit "emphasizes the increase of U.S. influence" and "illustrates the weakening of the Russian position." Playing up U.S. determination to follow through on its Middle East advantage despite the detente with Moscow, the article cited Kissinger's judgment that since the United States has now succeeded in moving the Arab states away from depending solely on Moscow, Washington is "obligated to strengthen that tendency."

PEKING REITERATES APPROVAL FOR EUROPEAN UNITY, U.S. ALLIANCE

Recent leadership changes in the three major European Common Market powers have not affected Peking's stance favoring EC cooperation and its approval of closer West European solidarity with the United States against Soviet influence. Peking has demonstrated continuing interest in European affairs, with articles assessing Common Market efforts to resolve economic disputes, highlighting European determination to maintain defense ties with the United States, and focusing on Western firmness in the European security and force reduction talks.

Peking's enthusiastic welcome to former U.K. Prime Minister Heath in late May demonstrated China's strong interest in encouraging European unity advocates. During a 25 May banquet for Heath, Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-ping indicated satisfaction that progress in cooperation had been made over the past year and had served to impede Soviet designs in Europe.

Peking has been frank to acknowledge recent EC problems stemming especially from Britain's demand to renegotiate its terms of entry and from revived restrictive tariffs by other states; but it has also stressed the members' renewed determination to resolve these issues expeditiously. NCNA's 2 June report of the first summit talks by FRG Chancellor Schmidt and French President Giscard underscored both sides' determination to preserve existing frameworks for cooperation and to make further progress in the EC. A 5 June NCNA article noted approvingly a softening in London's demand for renegotiation and a partial resolution of the tariff issue in reporting on recent EC ministerial meetings. It cited REUTER's observation that the EC has now "regained some of its air of dynamism." NCNA on the 3d reported favorably the

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
12 JUNE 1974

- 26 -

recent settlement of EC tariff dispute with the United States, pointing up President Nixon's 31 May observation that the agreement "represents a major step toward improved Atlantic relations."

U.S.-West Europe cooperation has also been stressed in reportage on defense issues, with a 5 June NCNA article citing the new French Prime Minister's assessment that Paris' alliance with the United States remains "indispensable to the security of France" despite Paris' decision to continue development of its independent nuclear deterrent. The FRG Foreign Minister was characterized as even more outspoken in a 27 May NCNA report citing his remark that the "Atlantic Alliance and the friendship with the United States remain the center of our security policy," and that without U.S. defense support "there can be no policy of European unity nor the policy of detente." Demonstrating Peking's clear preference for European preparedness over detente, the article noted the official's assertion that in no case can the policy of detente "replace the guaranteed security that we may get by means of the alliance" with the United States.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
12 JUNE 1974

- 27 -

CHINA

"WORKER THEORISTS" ORGANIZED TO HELP GUIDE ANTI-LIN CAMPAIGN

An article in the June issue of RED FLAG has laid down an organizational basis for waging the current mass ideological campaign in a controlled manner under party leadership. The article, entitled "Strengthen the Ranks of Marxist Theorists," called on party committees to organize a force of "professional theorists" made up of ideologically advanced workers. The creation of the new contingents dramatizes Peking's recent concern to direct the campaign toward party-approved goals and prevent it from being sidetracked by debilitating factional disputes or from affecting production.

There has been a supporting flurry of recent provincial radio reports on local efforts to train a new force of theorists. These reports have stressed that the new contingents must be responsive to party leadership and must not allow the struggle against Lin and Confucius to interfere with production. Party control over the contingents appears to be built in organizationally. A 2 June Harbin broadcast reported that party members and CYL members, as well as militiamen and educated youth, make up a large part of a local contingent's leadership core. The broadcast lauded the party branch of a local brigade for training "theoretical instructors" to serve as "assistants" to the party. A number of other broadcasts, such as one from Lanchow on 31 May, have focused on the responsibility of party organizations at all levels to exercise "positive leadership" over all theoretician contingents.

For the past several weeks PRC media have dwelt on the need to mobilize all available manpower to meet summer agricultural tasks and have argued that the campaign against Lin and Confucius should stimulate--not interrupt--production. The theorist contingents appear to facilitate this goal. Huhehot radio on 9 June praised a local contingent which visited a number of different production posts to convey party directives on the campaign to workers at their jobs. And a 3 June Nanchang report on efforts within a local shipyard to train worker theoreticians revealed that the theoreticians study on their own time during the evenings and then "report for work as usual the next morning."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

12 JUNE 1974

.. 28 -

The party's attempt to use the theorist contingents as a tool to curb overzealous revolutionary activity is apparently not going unchallenged in some areas. An unusually frank HUNAN DAILY editorial broadcast by Changsha radio on 7 June revealed that the campaign is running into opposition by those who see the theorists as evidence of "the brakes" being applied to the struggle against Lin and Confucius. The editorial defended the right of theorists to "talk about policy" and "strategy" to help develop unity among the revolutionary ranks and maintain production. In a strong call for strengthening unity among the working class, the editorial urged putting aside those problems which cannot be solved immediately and called for seeking "common ground while reserving minor differences."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
12 JUNE 1974

- 29 -

U S S R

PETRENKO UPHOLDS COLLEGIALITY, SCOLDS PARTY APPARATUS

F. F. Petrenko, the CPSU Central Committee functionary who authored the thinly veiled attack on Brezhnev's leadership in the April issue of QUESTIONS OF CPSU HISTORY, has returned to the fray with a vigorous reaffirmation of "collegial leaders."* In a 9 June PRAVDA article entitled "The Party and Democracy," Petrenko followed up his earlier advocacy of economic reforms by issuing a scorching rebuke to the party apparatus for attempting to interfere directly in the work of economic agencies, local soviets, and trade unions. The significance of the article lies not so much in the author's militant revisionism, which has remained consistent during the past decade, but in its appearance in the space PRAVDA usually reserves for major ideological exegeses--the same place occupied by Petrenko's last PRAVDA article on 19 October 1973.

As in his earlier articles on collective leadership, Petrenko stressed the importance of reaching official decisions on vital matters "not individually nor by narrow groups of leaders, but by democratic party forums" such as "party congresses, conferences and general party meetings." Aiming his sights at the highest as well as the lowest levels of authority he pointedly declared that "all other agencies of the party--from the bureau and committee of the primary party organization up to the Central Committee--are collegial leaders."

Petrenko also displayed his fundamental antipathy toward the authoritarian and secretive style of rule that has been a major hallmark of the Brezhnev regime in recent years. Citing provisions from the party statutes and from the controversial party program adopted in the Khrushchev era, he insisted that "all communists are guaranteed the right to discuss freely questions of policy and the party's practical activity." Criticism and self-criticism were called the "right" and "duty" of all party members, and the party leaders, in Petrenko's view, are obliged to consult regularly with the public on "the most important questions of domestic and foreign policy."

* For background, see the TRENDS of 30 May 1974, pages 23-29.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
12 JUNE 1974

- 30 -

By emphasizing the "public character" of the party's activities and calling it an "essential element of Soviet democracy," the Petrenko article was clearly designed to accommodate some of the trenchant criticisms of traditional party practices expressed in such suppressed samizdat publications as the POLITICAL DIARY and the CHRONICLE OF CURRENT EVENTS.

As in his PRAVDA article last October, Petrenko again attacked the interference of party apparatchiki in the economy as the main barrier to the full development of "socialist democracy." Calling the "delimitation of the functions of the party from the functions of other agencies" in the Soviet state a "fundamental aim of the CPSU," he went on to define this goal in unusually strong terms. He maintained not only that the party "does not replace nor supplant state and social agencies"--the conventional strictures against party interference in the economy--but that the party "does not command" those agencies as well. In issuing this strongly worded injunction against the party apparatus, Petrenko was perhaps attempting to define a more viable role for one of the appendages of a "ruling political organization" now comprising, according to his estimate, about 10 percent of the Soviet adult population.

It is noteworthy in this connection that Petrenko ended his article by citing a passage from the 18 May CPSU Central Committee's pre-election appeal:

The CPSU will steadfastly continue the line of comprehensively developing socialist sovereignty, raising the role of the soviets, strengthening socialist legality and state discipline, waging a struggle against manifestations of red tape and bureaucracy, and improving the work of the apparatus of administration.

Implementation of this pledge would clearly appeal to broad segments of what Petrenko and others have called a "developed socialist society," and would mark a radical departure from the practices of the recent past.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
12 JUNE 1974

- 31 -

UKRAINE, MOLDAVIA BREAK RANKS ON ACADEMIC CELEBRATION

The Ukraine and Moldavia--mainstays of Brezhnev's regional political support--notably failed to emulate other republics in celebrating the 250th anniversary of the USSR Academy of Sciences. The anniversary, originally scheduled to begin in Moscow on 14 May but indefinitely postponed according to a 6 May PRAVDA announcement,* was celebrated with great fanfare in the other republics. Moldavia completely ignored the anniversary, while in the Ukraine, First Secretary Shcherbitskiy, instead of commemorating the event as in other republics, launched an attack on Ukrainian social scientists and dispatched the Academy of Sciences leaders to the provinces to "meet with workers, kolkhozniks and the intelligentsia."

In the current round of election speeches, which is nearing completion, Politburo candidate members Demichev and Ustinov have thus far been the only top leaders to mention the academic anniversary and praise the academy's work. The embarrassment caused by the postponement of the celebration and the withdrawal of invitations sent to hundreds of foreign scholars was underscored by a pointed reminder in a recent journal article of the great international prestige that had been gained for the Soviet Union by the presence of numerous foreign scholars at the academy's 200th anniversary in 1925.

REPUBLIC CEREMONIES Republic celebrations of the academic anniversary were observed in Azerbaydzhan, Belorussia, Estonia, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Tadzhikistan and Uzbekistan on 23 May, in Armenia and Turkmenia on 24 May, in Georgia on 27 May, and in Kirgizia on 28 May. In all but two republics the local first secretary attended, and in three republics he delivered a speech. In addition, the Estonian and Belorussian first secretaries held private talks with delegations from the USSR Academy of Sciences attending their respective local ceremonies.

By contrast, as of early June the Ukraine had completely ignored the occasion. Instead, a Ukrainian Central Committee plenum on ideological shortcomings was held on 16-17 May, and First Secretary Shcherbitskiy's report focused on the low ideological level of work at Ukrainian institutes in the social sciences. Recalling

* See the TRENDS SUPPLEMENT of 29 May 1974, "The Struggle for Change in the Soviet Social Science."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
12 JUNE 1974

- 32 -

that the Ukrainian Politburo and Secretariat had discussed the state of research in the fields of party history, philosophy, economic theory and "scientific communism," Shcherbitskiy's report in the 17 May RADYANSKA UKRAINA complained that scholars were deviating from class positions and were poorly refuting bourgeois and revisionist theories. He placed part of the blame on former Ukrainian secretary for ideology Ovcharenko, a moderate, declaring that some former "responsible officials in charge of questions of ideology" had had a "negative influence on the development of social sciences." The 18 May PRAVDA account of Shcherbitskiy's report even alleged that the officials in question had tolerated various deviations "and sometimes even gave incorrect instructions in the name of the Central Committee but without its knowledge."

Shcherbitskiy declared that the Ukrainian Central Committee apparatus has now been directed to investigate the situation in economic science for review by the Ukrainian Politburo. He instructed party organizations to crack down on ideological deviations by social scientists and ordered Academy of Sciences President B. Ye. Paton and the head of the academy's social science section, I. K. Bilodid, to "seriously improve" leadership of social science institutes. Paton, who spoke at the plenum, pliantly accepted Shcherbitskiy's criticisms without complaint.

In lieu of a republic ceremony, the vice presidents of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences were sent out to speak on the anniversary at local meetings of scholars in Kharkov, Donetsk, Lvov and Odessa, while Paton addressed a Kiev factory meeting. The meetings were reported in RABOCHAYA GAZETA on 1 June, rather than in the main Central Committee organs RADYANSKA UKRAINA and PRAVDA UKRAINY. The 1 June article explained that Ukrainian scholars were commemorating the academy's anniversary by "meeting with workers, kolkhozniks and intelligentsia" in the towns and villages of the republic.

Although Shcherbitskiy in his plenum report also paid tribute to the "important role" of the scientific-technical intelligentsia--"the scholars and specialists of all branches of the economy"--in raising economic efficiency, his renewed attacks on social scientists are consistent with the hardline policies he has instituted in the Ukraine in the wake of Shelest's ouster in mid-1972.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
12 JUNE 1974

- 33 -

ELECTION SPEECHES

Most CPSU Politburo members and candidate members ignored the postponement of the academic celebration in their election speeches. With 15 of the 23 speeches already delivered, the subject was raised only by defense industry specialist Ustinov and ideological supervisor Demichev. The 31 May PRAVDA version of Ustinov's speech noted the "big and fruitful work of the USSR Academy of Sciences, the 250th anniversary of which is presently being widely observed by our country," while the 1 June PRAVDA report of Demichev's speech carried his reference to the important work of the academy, "the 250th anniversary of which we are observing."

Belorussian First Secretary Masherov while ignoring the subject in his election speech, had praised the "outstanding" work of the academy during his "cordial, friendly talk" in Minsk on 24 May with the visiting delegation of academicians from Moscow. On the other hand, at a Belorussian Central Committee plenum on ideology reported in the 30 April SOVIET BELORUSSIA, Masherov had "seriously reproached" the Belorussian Academy of Sciences' division of social sciences for alleged ideological lapses and had ordered measures to improve the ideological training of scientific cadres.

ANNIVERSARY ARTICLE

The embarrassment caused by the postponement of the anniversary was underscored by an article in the May issue of QUESTIONS OF HISTORY devoted to the participation of foreign scholars in the 1925 celebration of the 200th anniversary of the Academy of Sciences. The article described that ceremony as an extremely important event which won great prestige for the USSR, both scientifically and politically; 131 foreign scholars were reported to have attended the event, returning home with great praise for Soviet achievements. The article also noted the great efforts of the regime to attract foreign scholars to the event and the government's pledge to the academy to promote international contacts between scholars. This issue of the journal was signed to press on 29 April--on the eve of postponement of the 250th anniversary commemoration.

FIRING OF HISTORY INSTITUTE DIRECTOR VOLOBUYEV DETAILED

Further details on the purge of revisionist historian P. V. Volobuyev as director of the Institute of USSR History were provided in the May issues of QUESTIONS OF HISTORY and HISTORY OF THE USSR. Articles in the two journals indicate that the March 1973 conference of historians that convened in the Central Committee's science and educational

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

12 JUNE 1974

- 34 -

institutions section for the purpose of criticizing Volobuyev had recommended measures against the erring historian which were then approved by an 11 December general meeting of the history division of the USSR Academy of Sciences. Volobuyev was removed shortly thereafter by the academy's presidium.*

In the No. 3 issue for 1974 of HISTORY OF THE USSR, the organ of Volobuyev's institute, P. N. Pospelov, V. A. Kumanev and S. S. Khromov, without mentioning Volobuyev by name, outlined the measures taken by the bureau of the history division during 1971-73 against Volobuyev's deviations and recalled the numerous articles criticizing the work of his institute. The article attacked Volobuyev's attempts to take "a 'new reading' on some fundamental theses of Marxism-Leninism" and to "create some sort of 'new direction' in historical science." It declared that the current intensification of ideological struggle required sharp criticism of any deviations. The aging Pospelov had himself organized the initial campaign against Volobuyev while serving as acting academic secretary of the history division from April 1972 to June 1973, but had not succeeded.

Thereafter, Brezhnev's Stalinist cohort S. P. Trapeznikov, head of the Central Committee's science and educational institutions section, organized the March 1973 conference, and he again attacked Volobuyev's views in a July 1973 KOMMUNIST article. The May 1974 QUESTIONS OF HISTORY article indicates that the March 1973 conference exposed errors by historians and "outlined ways of correcting them" and that these recommendations were approved by the 11 December general meeting of the history division.

The February and March 1974 issues of QUESTIONS OF CPSU HISTORY reported that an 18 December meeting on party history of leaders of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism, the Academy of Social Sciences, and the Higher Party School had attacked Volobuyev's views. Volobuyev was last identified as institute director in an April ECONOMICS OF AGRICULTURE account of a December conference, and the May QUESTIONS OF HISTORY reported that at a 4 March general meeting of Academy of Sciences' history division, academic secretary of the division B. A. Rybakov announced that Volobuyev had been fired by the Academy of Sciences Presidium for "not coping with his job" and had been replaced by

* For background, see the Supplementary Article "New Ally for Leader of Soviet Revisionist Historians" in the TRENDS of 1 May 1974, and the TRENDS SUPPLEMENT of 29 May 1974, "The Struggle for Change in the Soviet Social Sciences."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
12 JUNE 1974

- 35 -

A. L. Narochnitskiy, a historian specializing in foreign policy from the Academy of Social Sciences. Narochnitskiy, who had criticized Volobuyev's writings at a July 1972 meeting of the history division, was first identified as director in the 9 May IZVESTIYA.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
12 JUNE 1974

- 36 -

NOTE

MOSCOW ON PALESTINIAN ISSUE: There has been no reflection in Soviet comment of recent Lebanese press reports that the USSR had promised to try to amend Security Council Resolution 242 to include a provision regarding Palestinian rights. Moscow did touch indirectly on the decision of the Palestine National Council, at its 1-9 June session in Cairo, to reject Resolution 242 as a basis for contacts in any forum, including the Geneva conference, because it deals with the Palestinian problem as a refugee issue and not as one of Palestinian national rights. A Moscow broadcast in Arabic on the 10th pegged to the council meeting declared that the Soviet Union viewed UN resolutions and the resumption of the Geneva conference in the context of securing the Palestinians' "legitimate rights." As if assuring the Arabs that the Soviet interpretation of Resolution 242 should satisfy their demands, it recalled that Brezhnev, in urging implementation of the resolution (in his address last October to the Moscow World Peace Congress), equated the resolution's call for a just settlement of the refugee problem with "insuring the legitimate rights of the Palestinian Arab people."

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
12 JUNE 1974

- 1 -

APPENDIX

MOSCOW, PEKING BROADCAST STATISTICS 3 - 9 JUNE 1974

<u>Moscow (2809 items)</u>			<u>Peking (876 items)</u>		
Supreme Soviet Elections	(10%)	13%	Vietnam [PRGRSV 5th Anniversary]	(1%)	19%
Vietnam [PRGRSV 5th Anniversary]	(1%)	7%	Criticism of Lin Piao and Confucius	(--)	15%]
China	(5%)	4%	Cambodia	(7%)	7%
Chile	(5%)	4%	Middle East [Chou Message to 12th Palestine National Council]	(11%)	6%
5th Anniversary of Moscow World Party Conference	(--)	4%	India	(4%)	6%
Afghanistan President Daud in USSR	(--)	3%		(1%)	2%]
Arab-Israeli Issue	(12%)	2%			
Brezhnev Meeting With Averell Harriman	(--)	2%		(3%)	3%

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.